November 7, 2022
Michael Maloney, one of the founders of Clemson’s economics PhD program, passed away a little over a year ago.
I came across his work a few years ago when I was trying to get a sense of how many “economics of property rights” courses were taught at the PhD level.
There is a larger number of courses in “institutional economics,” but unfortunately, a search for “property rights economics” reveals many classes on intellectual property and innovation. Not much along the lines of the good ol’ property rights tradition.
There were a few exceptions. Douglas Allen has one. And Maloney had one. Otherwise, I came up empty-handed. But I’d love to learn of others.
While his approach to property rights probably differs marginally from my own, Maloney’s class appeared to be thorough and provocative.
To get a taste of the course, try your hand at a just a few brilliant class questions listed on his website. Note the use of the classic “TFU” questions: 
“Parking at universities is always contentious. There are many issues: Why are students not
allowed to compete against faculty for the best parking? Why do they tow people after they receive and pay a given number of tickets? Wouldn’t a rational scheme allow people to continue to park legally or illegally so long as they pay the associated fines? Why do they even give tickets if capacity is not fully utilized?
Leasing does not occur in the case of elevators in an office building, while the furniture is often
rented. Why?
What are property rights? How do contracts affect property rights? What role do transaction costs play in property rights and contract structure? What function do property rights, contract structure, and transaction costs have in the Coasian view of the firm?
When you finance a car, you are forced to put some money down and then the finance
company lends you the rest. Why? Will you have to put more money down (in percentage
terms) on a used car or a new car? What about the down payment on a restored classic car?
On the basis of theory, which products do we expect to see brand named? Is theory
consistent with fact?
In many settings, such as a university, it is hard to monitor workers. For instance, many
business school professors shirk in the sense that they use the computer system, departmental
secretaries and research assistants for private consulting or writing textbooks. Some business
school deans have adopted a system of research budgets that are under the discretionary
control of each faculty member. What are the costs and benefits of this approach to solving the
contracting problem?
Firms belonging to trade association always reduce competition. TFU
University faculty members have excellent reputations for doing research, but their teaching is dreadful. The university is considering incentive compensation for professors in order to improve their teaching after complaints from students. What considerations are important for the university in measuring and rewarding teaching performance?”
My personal favorite: 
“In the grocery store, oranges are often sold loose or already packaged. Which oranges cost more by the pound or, in other words, if I were to give you one pound of either loose or packaged oranges, which would you choose?”
For the answer to this question, See Yoram Barzel’s analysis of tomatoes in his Economic Analysis of Property Rights.
More from Maloney:
An increase in the number of officials in a basketball game will result in more fouls committed.
True or false?
Block booking in the movie industry seems to have resulted from a measurement problem.
Explain
The positive externalities of shopping malls are well known. Alternatively, the shopping mall can also be interpreted as common-property resource problem. The argument applies to selling activity. Consumers are like fish, out there waiting to be hooked. Manufacturers and retailers use real resources to convert people from potential customers (free fish) into actual customers (captured fish). The customer is of no value to the seller until he is captured. The selling effort of each firm will raise the costs of its competitors, and, if the firms fail to take this into account, they will collectively overspend on selling (i.e., over fishing). Explain what institutional arrangement can be implemented to solving this “over fishing” problem for mutual benefits. Also, are there any problems or conflicts associated with implementing institutional arrangement? Can customers (fish) do anything to affect or be affected by the institutional arrangements? Finally, can the firms do anything to affect or be affected by the institutional arrangements?
The church, although not often thought of as such, is a firm designed to produce religious
goods. Like other firms it must meet its payroll, pay its creditors, plan for future contingencies, and act on a host of other day-to-day decisions. A church’s ability to survive requires an organizational form that is best able to produce a given amount of output. First, compare and contrast Coasian approach of the firm to the church. Second, explain how the decision-making process (i.e., property rights distributed among members) will, if at all, affect on the organizational structure of the church. Lastly, using theory of contracts, explain the different payment schemes, if any, for clergy and what effect does this have on productivity and growth of the church.
All marriage contracts are entered into with the promise, and most with the intention, to
deliver a lifetime stream of spousal services. These services are peculiar in that their value is crucially dependent on the attitude with which they are delivered and received. In reliance on the promise of these services, each party invests in assets specific to the marriage and foregoes other opportunities both for marriage and for other activities. First, explain what are the “specific assets” in a marriage, and what, if any, are their costs and benefits? Second, why enter into long-term contract of marriage given future uncertainty? Third, is the marriage contract arguably flawed and if so, how?
There is a movement in automobile retailing toward non-negotiable prices. There is also
some indication that automobile manufacturers may be opening company stores, that is,
outlets that they directly own as opposed to franchised dealerships. What might be the
cause of these phenomena? Are they possibly related? Do you think that these trends will
survive and thrive?
With a rise of two-earner household, the allocation of shopping responsibilities has changed. That is, the increase in the relative earnings of women has resulted in a rise in males shopping. How have manufacturers and retailers adjusted to this phenomena in they way they sell their products? Discuss the economic of contracting arrangement between the manufacturer and retailers.
Explain how the use of non-salvageable capital investment or “conspicuous” specific asset expenditure affects the price charged for high-quality products compared to low-quality products. Also, what role do these expenditures have on the information or noninformation content in advertising, and how does that affect the frequency and intensity of advertisements?
It’s a shame there aren’t more courses like this in typical economics PhD programs.
If there were, economics sure wouldn’t seem so dismal.